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NOTES
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES AND THE
SEARCH FOR PARITY-A CONFRONTATION
WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
In summing up, the cooperatives do perform many neces-
sary services, but their individual structures make it im-
possible for them to effectively compete with organized,
volume buyers. No one can argue against the theory of co-
operatives, but their fixed structures and lack of volume keep
them from meeting modern day agricultural pricing prob-
lems.'
Although the preceding statement hardly does justice to the
accomplishments and importance of the farmers cooperative move-
ment in the United States, it does point out the growing dissatis-
faction of American farmers with the existing framework of agri-
cultural marketing mechanisms. This dissatisfaction, coupled with
what is called the "price-cost squeeze," are the ingredients of dis-
content that produced the hesitant birth and stormy growth of the
National Farmers Organization-the self-acclaimed David who is
doing battle with the Goliath food store chains in an effort to secure
the blessing of parity and thus maintain an American institution, the
family farm.
2
1. National Farmers Organization Pamphlet, Necessary Steps To Be Taken For
Successful Bargaining In Agriculture, Page 3 (Undated).
2. See BRANDSBERG, THE Two SIDES OF NFO's BATTLE (1964). In an extremely well
written account of the National Farmers Organization's Inception and subsequent growth
and problems, Mr. Brandsberg points out that every 20 to 80 years for the past century
.. *. . a radical or at least loudly protesting farm movement has risen and fallen with
almost predictable regularity." Id. at 260,. Brandsberg points out that the "price--cost
squeeze" Is one of the evils the NFO Is fighting. The phrase is descriptive of the situation
where the price for the farmer's product remains static or declines while the cost of farm
production steadily rises. As to the success of the NFO's efforts, the author states:
"Examined objectively, the NFO record did not show too many constructive accomplish-
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This note will not attempt to analyze the economic implications
of agricultural cooperative marketing, but rather it will be confined
to the question of whether the cooperative entity, as a legal concept,
is an adequate marketing arrangement in view of current antitrust
policy. The note will briefly outline the legislative scheme of the
agricultural cooperatives within the broader spectrum of the anti-
trust laws; trace the development of judicial interpretation of such
legislation; and finally, appraise the strength and status of the North
Dakota cooperative movement.
II. LEGLISLATIVE BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
In 1890, Congress formulated one of the most far-reaching pieces
of legislation ever conceived-the Sherman Act.3 It was the cul-
mination of post civil war unrest on the part of the nation's consum-
ers and small producers regarding the economic power of the large
business combines.4 One of the most ardent groups urging adoption
of the Act was the farmers since they, as a class, were particularly
susceptible to the monopoly practices then employed by industry.5
An amendment was offered to except farmers from the operation of
the Act but it was defeated,6 probably less from anti-farmer senti-
ment than the generally accepted view that farmers could not, due
to their dispersed numbers and lack of concentrated marketing pow-
er, monopolize the agricultural products industry.
7
The Sherman Act provides that contracts or combinations in
the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, which result in
restrain in trade among the several states, or between the District
of Columbia and any state or states, are illegal and punishable as a
misdemeanor. Moreover, an attempt to monopolize is also prohibi-
ted. The obvious purpose of the Act is to foster competition, or
rather, enforce it.
The states were quick to follow with antitrust legislation of their
ments. Because it involved conflict and controversy, the NFO's activities had netted a
great deal of attention in the news media. This in a way was useful since many non-
farm persons had no idea of the farmer's plight. At the same time, much of this publicity
distorted the farm problem and implied that all farmers were in a state of poverty.
However, controversy is one criterion of what is news and the NFO promoted plenty of
controversy. Thus some segments of the popular press turned some NFO activities into
big stories that they perhaps did not deserve to be." Id. at 263.
3. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1964).
4. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 145 (1940).
5. Id. n. 1.
6. The proposed amendment read:
"Provided, that this act shall not be construed to apply to any arrangements, agree-
ments, or combinations between laborers made with a view of lessening the number of
hours of their labor or of increasing their wages; nor to any arrangements, agreements,
associations, or combinations among persons engaged in horticulture or agricllture made
with a view of enhancing the price of their own agricultural or horticultural products."
21 CONG. Rlc. 2726 (1890).
7. Tigner v. Texas, aupra note 4, at 145.
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own." Many of them, however, exempted organizations of farmers
from the operation of the acts which the Sherman Act failed to do.
This exemption was not to be enjoyed for long. In the case of
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 9 the Supreme Court was faced
with the constitutionality of the Illinois Trust Statute of 1893 which
contained the exemption. The pipe company had sued Connolly on a
note and Connolly contended that the note was void as the pipe com-
pany had violated the Trust Statute. 0 The Illinois federal district
court disagreed and held that the statute was unconstitutional."'
The Supreme Court affirmed the unconstitutionality of the Illi-
nois statute as a denial of equal protection of the laws under the
fourteenth amendment since it applied to non-agricultural producers
but not agricultural producers.12 In effect, the Court recognized no
difference, in 1902, as between the economic realities of agriculture
and industry and concluded that any such distinction would be a
manifest denial of the equal protection of the law as to preclude any
"further or extended argument." 13
Illinois was not the only state to have its antitrust statute chal-
lenged on the same basis as that of Connolly. 4 The net effect of
these decisions was to invalidate state antitrust laws containing
the exemption, but they did not prohibit the formation of coopera-
tives.15
In 1940, the doctrine of the Connolly case was finally rejected
in Tigner v. Texas.' 6 Although the time span between Connolly and
Tigner covers 38 years, Connolly had been under attack for at least
8. North Dakota exemplifies the action taken by the states. Chapter 51-08, Pools and
Trusts, of the NORTH DAKOTA CENTURYY CODE was originally enacted in chapter 174 of
the Session Laws of 1890, the same year the Sherman Act was enacted.
9. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902). [hereinafter cited as Con-
nolly] Neither party to the action was engaged in agricultural pursuits.
10. The statute voided any contracts made in violation of its terms. Id. at 554. Illinois
Laws of 1893, P. 89, § 1 (repealed 1965).
11. 99 F. 3541 (N.D. 1i1. 1900). The court held that the exemption given to farmers
was clearly an exercise of improper class legislation. Id. at 355.
12. 'These principles [regarding equal protection of the law under the fourteenth
amendment] condemn the statute of Illinois. We have seen that under that statute all
except producers of agricultural commodities and raisers of livestock, who combine their
capital, skill or acts for any of the purposes named In the act, may he punished as crimi-
nals, while agriculturists and livestock raisers, in respect of their products or livestock
in hand, are exempted from the operation of the statute, and may combine and do that
which, if done by others, would be a crime against the State. The statute so provides
notwithstanding persons engaged in trade or in the sale of merchandise or commodities,
within the limits of a State, and agriculturists and raisers of livestock, are all in the
same general claVs, that is, they are all alike engaged in domestic trade, which is of
right, open to all, subject to such regulations, applicable to all in like conditions, as the
State may legally prescribe." 184 U.S. at 560 (emphasis supplied by the Court).
13. Id. at 564.
14. A similar statlte was declared unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment in
Texas. In Re Grice, 79 F. 627 (N.D. Tex. 1897), rev'd on other grounds, 169 U.S. 284
(1898).
15. H ULBERT, LEGAL PHASES OF COOPERATIVE AssOcIATIONS, FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRA-
TION, USDA, BULLETIN No. 50, 204 (1942)
16. Tigner v. Texas, supra note 4.
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10 years prior to the Tigner coup de grace. 17 The Court in Tigner
recognized that there was a very real difference between agricul-
ture and other economic pursuits and held that the Texas legis-
lature had the power to exempt agricultural producers from its
antitrust law without violating the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 8 The Court said that "[T]he Constitution
does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same. . . Connolly's
case has been worn away by the erosion of time, and . . . it is no
longer controlling.' 19
Back at the farm, however, there was no little apprehension
that the Sherman Act, in the years immediately following its pas-
sage, would be a substantial threat to the continued operation of
the cooperatives. Technically, this apprehension was well founded.
A cooperative certainly consists of a combination of individual farm-
ers, and by attempting to market their products collectively, such
activities might be held in violation of the Act.
Congress, in 1914, made a qualified step in the direction of
exempting agricultural cooperatives from the antitrust laws by
passing the Clayton Act.2 0 Section 6 of the Act provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or arti-
cle of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws
shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of
labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted
for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital
stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain indi-
vidual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying
out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organiza-
tions, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be il-
legal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, un-
der the antitrust laws.
21
A cursory examination of the section reveals that it applies only
17. See Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Market-
ing Ass'n, 276 U.S. 71 (1928). The Court indicated that the states might legislate
regarding farmers as a class without violating the fourteenth amendment. The Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Bingham Cooperative Marketing Act (Ch. 1, Acts of
Kentucky 1922), which was widely used throughout the states as a model. Section 28 of
the Bingham Act, for example, declaring cooperatives not to be in violation of the anti-
trust provisions, Is substantially the same as North Dakota's statute. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 10-15-59 (1960).
18. "At the core of all these enactments [state agriclltural cooperative legislation]
lies a conception of price and production policy for agriculture very different from that
which underlies the demands made upon industry and commerce by the antitrust laws.
These various measures are manifestations of the fact that in our national econmy agri-
culture expresses functions and forces different from the other elements in the total co-
nomic process. Certainly these are differences which may be acted upon by the lawmak-
ers." 310 U.S. at 146, 147.
19. Id.
20. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
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to non-stock, non-profit cooperatives. Moreover, in the Duplex22
case, the Court held that the section would not grant immunity
where the organization (a labor union in this case) violated the anti-
trust laws by departing from its legitimate objects.23 The section
does, however, relieve such organizations from prosecution under
the antitrust laws in one respect: the mere existence and operation of
the organization is not, per se, a violation of such laws.
Shortly after the Duplex decision was rendered in 1921, Congress
again began, in earnest, to clarify the status of the cooperatives.
The result was the passage of the Capper-Volstead Act 24 in 1922-
the Magna Carta of the cooperatives. The Act allows farmers, plant-
ers, dairymen, nut or fruit growers to act together in associations
with or without capital stock, corporate or otherwise, in processing,
preparing for market, and marketing their products in interstate or
foreign commerce. Marketing agencies in common are permitted
and the associations and their members may make any necessary
contracts to effect the purposes of the association. To qualify under
the Act, an association must be operated for the mutual benefit
of the members; it must allow each member one vote regardless of
stock or membership capital held, or it must not pay dividends in
excess of 8 per cent per annum on stock or membership capital;
and, in all cases, the association may not handle the products of
non-members in an amount greater in value than it handles for
members.
Section 2 of the Act provides that the Secretary of Agriculture
shall have the authority to determine whether such association is
monopolizing or restraining trade to the extent that the price of agri-
cultural products is unduly enhanced. If the Secretary so determines,
a cease and desist order is to be issued, which is to be enforced by the
Department of Justice. The Department of Justice has hotly con-
tested this apparent authority of the Secretary of Agriculture in the
antitrust area, as will be shown in part III. of this note.
The intent of the Capper-Volstead Act as to a cooperative's status
under the antitrust laws is not clear. Indeed, there were conflicting
statements on the matter during the various debates on the merits of
the Act. 25 And although the legislative intent may not be clear, it is
22. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
23. Id. at 469.
24. 42 Stat. 888 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1964).
25. Perhaps the most convincing argument for the contention that the Act does not
exempt the cooperatives from the antitrust laws was that provided by Rep. Volstead: "The
objections made to these organizations at present Is that they violate the Sherman Antitrust
Act, and that Is upon the theory that each farmer is a separate business entity, when he
combines with his neighbor for the purpose of securing better treatment in the disposal of
his crops, he is charged with a conspiracy or combination contrary to the Sherman Anti-
trust Act. Businessmen can combine by putting their money into corporations, but it is
impractical for farmers to combine their farms into similar corporate form. The object
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useful to ask what was to be accomplished by the Act if exemption
from the antitrust laws was not intended since the Clayton Act had
already provided that non-stock cooperatives were not in violation
of the antitrust laws. Another argument in favor of exemption is that
the purposes of the antitrust laws and the Federal Government's
commitment to maintain agricultural prices at a reasonable level
are inconsistent with each other.
26
Significant subsequent legislation containing references to the
antitrust immunity of agricultural cooperatives acting alone or with
the Secretary of Agriculture are the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933,27 the Robinson-Patman Act,28 the Agricultural Marketing
of this bill Is to modify the laws under which business organizations are now formed,
so that farmers may take advantage of the form of organization that is used by business
concerns. It is objected in some quarters that this repeals the Sherman Antitrust Act as
to farmers. That is not true any more than it is not true that a combination of two
or three corporations violates the Act . . . If these organizations should combine with
corporations not organized as provided in this bill to thus monopolize or restrain trade,
they will become subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act just the same as any other com-
bination of corporations. We are merely seeking to give them a status that may be nec-
essary to meet industrial conditions." 61 CONG. REC. 1033 (1921).
Rep. Volstead's emphasis on the objective of allowing farmers to band together in
corporations to achieve greater marketing strentgh was pertinent at the time of the Act's
passage. In light of the subsequent growth of corporate farming, however, can it be said
that the agricultural industry no longer requires or justifies the antitrust immunity pro-
vided by the act? It would appear that the question should be answered in the negative.
First, it must be emphasized that the legal form or organization has little to do
with the farming unit's bargaining power. A small family farm with a modest Income
could perhaps be incorporated, but the change in legal form, per se, hardly can be said to
increase the unit's bargaining strength. The Capper-Volstead Act recognizes this fact by
allowing individual farm units to collectively incorporate and thus provides for the con-
centration of large numbers of producers that is essential to effectively compete in the
market place.
Second, the corporate form is still far from being a dominant part of the agricul-
tural scene. As of 1961, corporations held only 5% of the nation's farmland. STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITE- STATES 614 (Bureau of the Census, 78th Ed. 1961). Moreover, in
1965, there were only 23,000 corporations engaged in agricultural, forestry, and fishery
industries as compared to 3,578,000 sole proprietorships and partnerships. The corpora-
tions accounted for $5,978,000,000 in gross receipts as compared to $35,183,000,000 report-
ed by sole proprietorships and partnerships. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
489 (Bureau of the Census, 86th Ed. 1965). These figures indicate that the extent of cor-
porate activity is still relatively small and would not appear to demand any change in the
antitrust immunity provided by the Capper-Volstead Act.
There is some indication, however, that the Act was at least intended to relieve
cooperatives from criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act:
"It is intended, then, as I understand the Senator, to make all such organizations ab-
solutely immune from criminal prosecution?" (question by Senator King 62 CONe. Rc.
2049 [1922]).
"They are Immune from criminal prosecution, and I think they ought to be." (reply
by Senator Kellogg, 62 CONe. RFc. 2049 [1922]).
26. The purpose of the antitrust laws is to foster competition while the Capper-Volstead
Act's purpose Is to reduce competition by allowing farmers to collectively market their
goods. These conflicting policies are difficult to harmonize and to avoid such conflict, it
would seem that the cooperatives should not be subjected to the antitrust laws. See Note,
Cooperatives and the Antitrust Laws, 27; IND. L.J. 430, 436 (1952).
27. "In order to effectuate the declared policy of this chapter, the Secretary of Agri-
culture shall have the power, after due notice and opportunity for hearing, to enter into
marketing agreements with processors, producers, association of producers, and others
engaged in the handling of any agricultural commodity or product thereof, only with re-
spect to such handling as in the current of Interstate or foreign commerce or which di-
rectly burdens, obstructs, or affects, interstate or foreign commerce In such commodity
or product thereof. The making of any such agreement shall not be held to be In viola-
tion of any of the antitrust laws of the United States, and any such agreement shall be
deemed to be lawful .... " 48 Stat. 34 (1933), 7 U.S.C. § 608b (1964).
28. "Nothing in sections 13-13b and 21a of this title shall prevent a cooperlative as-
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Agreement Act of 1937,29 and the Cooperative Marketing Act of
1926.30 The Fisherman's Collective Marketing Act,31 while not deal-
ing with agricultural cooperatives, is most valuable in determining
the antitrust exemption of cooperative enterprises generally. These
Acts will be considered further in part III.
III. COURTS AND THE COOPERATIVES-AN UNEASY ALLIANCE
PART A - PROLOGUE
The status of agricultural cooperatives, in relation to the fed-
eralantitrust laws, is in many respects unique. In examin-
ing this status, we are faced, on the one hand, with the princi-
ple of free competition embodied in the Sherman Act; and
on the other hand, with numerous congressional enactments
favoring cooperation among farmers, and fostering the growth
of agricultural cooperatives.
3 2
The above statement by Stanley Barnes reflects the enigmatic
situation with which the courts have been confronted. Subsequent
judicial interpretation of the Capper-Volstead and Clayton Acts, es-
pecially since 1939, has shown that exemption under the antitrust
laws is not to be lightly implied;3 3 but yet agricultural co-
operatives have enjoyed some measure of immunity as a develop-
ment of the cases will indicate. Whatever immunity exists is per-
haps due to the federal policy of encouragement noted by Barnes.
However that may be, the ultimate question of specific limits be-
yond which the cooperative may not go is not settled.
PART B - THE ISSUES ARE JOINED
In 1939, the Supreme Court announced the "other person" doc-
trine. 34 A criminal action brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
against the Pure Milk Association, a cooperative, and a group of
major milk distributors had been dismissed by the Illinois federal
district court. 5 The indictment alleged a conspiracy to fix and main-
soclatlon from returning to its members, producers, or consumers the whole, or any part
of the net earnings or surplus resulting from its trading operations, in proportion to their
purchases or sales from, to, or through the association." 49 Stat. 1528 (1936). 15 U.S.C.
§ 13b (1964).
29. "No meeting so held and no award or agreement so approved (by Secretary of
Agriculture) shall be deemed In violation of any of the Antitrust laws." 50 Stat. 248
(1937), 7 U.S.C. § 671 (1964).
30. 44 Stat. 802 (1926), 7 U.S.C. §§ 451-457 (1964).
31. 48 Stat. 1213 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 521-522 (1964). The Act is almost identical to
the Capper-Volstead Act except that it deals with fishermen and was enacted in 1934, 12
years after the Capper-Volstead Act was passed.
32. From an address by Stanley N. Barnes to the American Institute of Cooperation
held at the University of Missouri in 1953. At that time Mr. Barnes was the Assistant
Attorney General in Charge of Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice.
AMERIcAN CooPaIU&TzON 26 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Barnes or Barnes' address].
33. California v. Federal Power Comm'n., 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1961).
34. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Borden].
85. 28 F.Supp. 177 (N.D. IlL 1939). There were mIltiple defendants named in the in-
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tain uniform, arbitrary and non-competitive milk prices in the Chi-
cago area. The lower court held that the production and marketing of
milk were controlled by the terms of the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937, and that the cooperative's officers were
exempt from prosecution by virtue of Section 6 of the Clayton Act
and the Capper-Volstead Act.
In overruling the decision of the district court, the Supreme
Court rejected the premise that, in the absence of an agreement en-
tered into by the Secretary of Agriculture, the terms of the Agri-
cultural Marketing Agreement Act prevented the Justice Depart-
ment from prosecuting under the Sherman Act.3 6
The Court, in discussing the protection against antitrust action
afforded by the Capper-Volstead Act said:
The right of these agricultural producers thus to unite in
preparing for market and in marketing their products, and to
make the contracts which are necessary for that collabora-
tion cannot be deemed to authorize any combination or con-
spiracy with other persons in restraint of trade that these
producers may see fit to devise.3 7
A severe blow was also struck in Borden to the contention that
the Secretary of Agriculture had exclusive jurisdiction, under the
Capper-Volstead Act, to police the cooperative's activities. There
the Court said:
We think that the procedure under Section 2 of the Capper-
Volstead Act is auxiliary and was intended merely as a
qualification of the authorization given to cooperative agri-
cultural producers by Section 1, so that if the collective
action of such producers, as there permitted, results in the
opinion of the Secretary in monopolization or unduly en-
dictment. Besides the Pure Milk Association, Borden Co., the distributors, Milk Wagon
Drivers Union Local No. 753, the Chicago Board of Health and numerous others were
joined as defendants.
36. The lower court had determined that the " . . . power of regulation, supervision,
and control of the milk industry, In any given milk shed, is, by the Agricultural Market-
ing Agreement Act of 1937, vested exclusively in the Secretary of Agriculture. It follows
further that the Secretary . . . cannot by his own action, or inaction, divest himself of
this power so long as the statute remains in force. The marketing of the agricultural
products, including milk ... is removed from the purview of the Sherman Act." 28 F.Supp.
at 187.
The Supreme Court answered this contention by saying: "We are of the opinion
that this conclusion is erroneous. No provision of that Purport appears in the Agricultural
Act While effect is expressly given . . . to agreements and orders which may validly be
made by the Secretary .... There is no suggestion that in their absence, and apart from
such qualified authorization and such requirements as they contain, the commerce In ag-
ricultural commodities is stripped of the safeguards set up by the Antitrust Act and is
left open to the restraints, however unreasonable, which conspiring producers, distributors
and their allies may see fit to impose. We are unable to find that such a grant of im-
munity by virtue of the Inaction, or limited action, of the Secretary has any place in the
statutory plan. We cannot believe that Congress intended to creat 'so great a breach in
historic remedies and sanctions.' " 308 U.S. at 198.
37. Id. at 204 (emphasis added)
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hanced prices, he may intervene and seek to control the
action thus taken under Section 1. But as Section 1 cannot
be regarded as authorizing the sort of conspiracies be-
tween producers and others . . the qualifying procedure for
which Section 2 provides is not to be deemed to be design-
ed to take the place of, or to postpone or prevent, prosecu-
tion under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for the purpose
of punishing such conspiracies. 8
The Borden decision clearly shows that an agricultural coopera-
tive cannot combine with non-cooperative entities in restrictive trade
practices prohibited by Section 1 of the Sherman Act and expect
to receive the blessings of the courts. 9
In United States v. Elm Spring Farm,40 the defendant had at-
tempted to change his status from a handler of milk products to a
producer in order to avoid making payments to the Market Admin-
istrator under a marketing order issued under the Agricultural Mar-
keting Agreement Act. As the court said, " . . . [t]he plan adopted
was ingenious but transparent."' 41 In other words, a cooperative in
name will not be accorded the legislative benefits given a cooper-
ative in fact. Sham transactions do not create a bona fide cooper-
ative and the thin veneer of appearance will be disposed of quick-
ly by the courts.
Judge McColloch endeared himself to the cooperatives' cause
in a short but very explicit opinion in United States v. Dairy Co-op
Ass'n.42 It was a critical test case for the Justice Department since
only a cooperative was involved. In the absence of other conspira-
tors, cooperative or not, the stage was set for a direct confrontation
with the issue of whether a cooperative, acting alone, could be held
in violation of the antitrust laws. The opinion does not set forth
the specific allegations, but rather Judge McColloch devoted his
energies to assuring the Justice Departmtnet that he would not vio-
late the clear intent of Section 6 of the Clayton Act by holding to
their position. 43 The defendant's motion for a finding of not guilty
was granted.
38. Supra note 36, at 206.
39. "Students of cooperative and antitrust law have attempted to analyze the full Im-
port of the Borden decision. It is clear that the sort of conspiracies between producers
and others . . . charged in [the Borden] indictment fall within the ambit of antitrust
coverage. But the question arises whether the result reached In Borden stems exclusively
from the fact that there the cooperative combined with non-agricultural entities, or wheth-
er it reflects, In the particular circumstances of that case, the principle that a cooperative
may not inflict on commerce restraints beyond those inherent in the nature of the or-
ganization." Saunders, The Status of Agricultural Cooperatives Under the Antitru st Laws,
20 FED. B.J. 35, 47 (1960).
40. 38 F.Supp. 508 (D. Mass. 1941).
41. Id. at 511.
42. 49 F.Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1943).
43. "An older generation of judges interpreted the Clayton Act . . . to defeat the plain
intent of the law, and almost perversely, It seemed, sought to Impose their economic views
on the American scene in the controversial field of capital and labor . . . . Now I am
534 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
After a few years of relative peace,4 4 the struggle resumed in
1949 with a series of cases involving the Maryland and Virginia Milk
Producers Association. The first decision45 was the result of an appeal
from the district court dismissing an indictment against the coop-
erative as not setting forth sufficient facts to constitute a conspiracy
in violation of the Sherman Act. 46 As a technical matter, however,
the indictment itself was held sufficient on appeal, the court holding
that violations of the Sherman Act were alleged without passing on
their merits. 47 Moreover, the court said:
Although the Capper-Volstead Act . . .and the Clayton Act
... give some privileges to combinations of agricultural pro-
ducers, a combination of producers and distributors to elim-
inate competition and fix prices at successive stages in the
marketing of an agricultural product is not privileged.4 8
asked to "interpret" the other provisions of the Clayton Act which say generally that a
farmers' cooperative shall not be subject to the antitrust laws. I am asked to hold that
under certain circumstances, even when acting solely in its self-interest, and not In con-
cert with others, a farmers' cooperative can be punished as a monopoly. I am asked to
hold that In this case, which I am told is the first case brought by the Antitrust Division
of the Dept. of Justice against a farmers' cooperative acting alone and not In concert
with others, the defendant Is attempting to create a monopoly and is punishable crim-
inally. In short, I am asked to scuttel the plain language of the Clayton Act as to co-
operatives, as anti-labor courts scuttled the labor provisions of the same act, with the
serious consequences that endure to this hour." Id.
44. At this point It would be usedful to insert two cases arising under the Fisherman's
Collective Marketing Act. 8upra note 31. In Hinton v. Columbia River Packers Association,
131 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1942) the appellant was the representative for the Pacific Coast
Fisherman's Union. The Union, a cooperative, had from 90 to 100% of the fishermen
on the coastal states of Oregon, Washington and Alaska as members. The Union told the
Packers Association that it would have to buy fish from the Union. The Packers'Associa-
tion refused and the Union brought pressure to bear on the fishermen to coerce them not
to sell to the Association. In an earlier decision, 117 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1941), the court
had held that a labor dispute was Involved (apparently because of the "union" designa-
tion of the cooperative) and that the provisions of the Norris LaGuardia Act were ap-
plicable and had not been complied with. That judgment was reversed by the Supreme
Court, 815 U.S. 143 (1942), on the ground that there was no labor dispute involved. In the
instant case, the Court held that the "Union" was not exempt from Sherman Act and that
the decision In Borden was controlling. The Union was held liable since it combined with
individual fishermen and thereby acquired the power to fix prices and control production
which effectively precluded competition in the market.
In Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Industries, 41 F.Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1941), an
association was held liable under the antitrust laws where the plaintiff, although he had
a contract with a canning company, was not permitted to fish in the area of Monterey and
to market his fish there because the boat he had chartered was not "assigned" to the
company as was the practice of the association. This restrictive practice engaged in by
the defendant association and cooperating canners was held to be an illegal combination
in restraint of trade.
The two cases indicate that the Fisherman's Collective Marketing Act provides no
greater imumnity to fisherman cooperatives than the Capper-Volstead Act gives to their
agricultural counterparts.
45. United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n., 179 F.2d 426 (D.C.
Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 831 (1949).
46. The indictment charged that the Association, comprised of nearly 1,500 producers,
its Secretary-Treasurer and seven milk distributors had conspired together to eliminate
and suppress competition. The indictment further charged that the distributors had en-
tered into "full supply" contracts whereby the distributors were bound to buy all of their
milk requirements from the Association. The indictment also alleged that the conspirators
fixed the price of milk in the Washington, D. C. area and entered into agreements to
that effect. Id. at 427, 428.
47. Indeed, the court said that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the
Sherman Act. 179 F.2d at 428.
48. I&
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When the case was remanded," the district court held that the
Association and those distributors who persisted in the use of full
supply contracts embodying the classification plan,50 after the Sec-
retary of Agriculture had withdrawn as a party to the agreement,
were guilty under Section 3 of the Sherman Act. 5 1 Judge Holtzoff,
however, upheld a cooperative's apparent monopoly privilege:
... [F]armer's cooperatives are expressly exempted from
the provisions of the antitrust laws. Farmers have a spe-
cial dispensation. They may combine with impunity .... Con-
sequently, the Maryland and Virgina Milk Producers Associ-
ation, in marketing the milk shipped by its members, and
acting as an agent for that purpose, does not violate the
Sherman Act, even if in so doing it fixes prices and restrains
trade. Its impunity ends, however, at the point where it
commences to act in concert with others. Its exemption
ceases when it crosses the line of individual action and com-
bines with other persons who are not farmers.2
If Judge Holtzoff's utterance on the freedom of cooperatives to
individually fix prices and restrain trade was not enough to shake
the very foundation of the Justice Department itself, the subsequent
decision on appeal from the district court must have been a trau-
matic experience for the Antitrust Division. 53 The court of appeals
reversed the conviction of the association and the distributors, hold-
ing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the charges. The
opinion cannot be regarded as an unqualified approval of full supply
classified use contracts since the court only held that the Justice
Department failed to sustain the burden of proof.
5
4
Two years later, in the summer of 1953, the American Institute
49. 90 F.Supp. 681 (D.D.C. 1950).
50. The classification plan is simply a system of milk pricing. "Farmers, through their
cooperative associations, devised a plan to encourage handlers to accept milk regularly
from farmers who had made the investment required to produce high-quality milk, even
in periods in which the handlers had no fluid outlets for some of the milk purchased.
Through their cooperative associations, they worked out with dealers a system of dif-
ferentiated prices. These were called classified use plans, and required the payment of a
higher price to farmers for milk sold In fluid outlets than for milk processed and sold
as a product like butter and cheese. These plans were in effect in a number of the largest
markets in the country by about 1920." Brooks, The Pricing of Milk Under Federal Mar-
keting Orders. 26 GEo. WASH. L. Ruv. 181, 185 (1958).
51. In 1940, the parties had entered into a marketing agreement with the Secretary of
Agriculture pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, supra n. 29,
which included the classification plan. In 1947, the Association became restive and wanted
to rid itself of the controls inherent in a marketing agreement administered by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture. The agreement was dissolved but the alleged conspirators continued
the use of the full supply-classified use contracts. Judge Holtzoff felt that after the Govern-
ment had removed itself from the agreement, the parties were at the mercy of the anti-
trust laws. "The Court is of the opinion that 'full supply' contracts which embodied the
classification plan for arriving at the price of milk constituted, in effect, agreements to
fix prices. It Is well settled that an agreement to fix prices of a commodity is per se an
unreasonable restraint of trade and:... a violation of the Sherman Act." Supra note 49, at
689.
52. Id. at 685, 686.
53. 193 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
54. "But the trouble is that, as plausible as the government's economic theory Is, it
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of Cooperation invited Stanley Barnes to speak at its Summer In-
stitute in Missouri.55 Barnes warned the producers that although
current congressional policy encouraged cooperatives, no blanket
immunity from the antitrust laws was conferred upon them.
Furthermore, the privilege conferred by Section 6 of the Clay-
ton Act and the Capper-Volstead Act was stated by Barnes as being
limited to the right of producers to " . . . associate for the lawful
carrying out of the legitimate objectives of agricultural associa-
tions. ' ' 56 The address also emphasized the illegality of combining
with non-cooperatives (the other persons doctrine), and speculated on
the possible adverse consequences of farmers limiting their produc-
tion or destroying crops in the field in the absence of governmental
participation. 57 But Barnes left much unanswered when he said:
We are on firm ground in saying that farmer cooperatives
are in all respects accountable under the antitrust laws ex-
cept as to conduct authorized by the Clayton Act or the Cap-
per-Volstead Act. The difficult problem is determining the
scope of sanctions given by these acts.5 8
The message of the Justice Department had been delivered.
The cranberry industry was also experiencing its antitrust prob-
lems. In a civil suit 59 brought against a cranberry cooperative by
a non-cooperative competitor, the plaintiff alleged that through the
concerted effort of the cooperative and a bank he could not effec-
tively compete for a share of the market.60
is not enough to sustain these convictions. It must apepar beyond a reasonable doubt
that these . . . corporations were guilty as charged, or their convictions cannot stand.
In pronouncing them guilty, the court was relying on the economic hypothesis that full
supply-classified use contracts tend unlawfully to fix prices and to restrain trade. There
was no expert evidence to support the hypothesis and, had there been, It would not have
supported a finding of guilt. It is still the law that there can be no conviction of crime
on circumstantial evidence unless the only possible inference to be derived from It is that
of guilt . . . It is equally true that guilt cannot be inferred from an unsupported eco-
nomic theory. Id. at 917.
55. Barnes, supra note 31'
56. Id. at 28.
57. "It would also appear clsar that an agricultural cooperative association would run
afoul of the antitrust laws If It should undertake, by agreement among Its members, to
limit production or to destroy crops In the field. In this regard, I would like to point out
that about two years ago, the Antitrust Division brought action against lettuce growers
in California charging that they had agreed to restrict the amount of lettuce produced bY
destruction of crops In the peak period of the harvesting season. Such an agreement would
be permissible only if the Capper-Volstead Act grants an exemption. But that act, In au-
thorizing collective action by farmers for the 'processing, preparation for market, handling
and marketing' of agricultural products, does not appear to authorize limitations upon pro-
duction . . . my concern Is to point out to you the profound distinction between private
action In this field and action by duly constituted officials of a representative govern-
ment." (emphasis supplied by Barnes) Id. at 31, 32. Barnes was obviously referring to
governmental production control programs as opposed to Individual actions.
58. Id. at 29.
59. Cape Cod Food Products v. National Cranberry Ass'n., 119 F.Supp. 900 (D. Mass.
1954).
60. In 1946, there was an overproduction In the cranberry Industry. Demand was In
the area of 3,000,000 cases production was nearer 6,000,000 cases. The Association mem-
bers themselves produced about 3,000,000 cases and it was their desire to satisfy tne de-
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Judge Wyzanski, in his extensive instructions to the jury, said
that it was not unlawful under the antitrust laws for a cooperative
to capture 100 per cent of the market, if it is done by way of market-
ing agreements as contemplated under the Capper-Volstead Act.6 l
The jury returned an award of $175,000.00 to the plaintiff. It
should be noted that this case again involved "other persons."
In 1956, the Justice Department orignated in action against the
Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers and the Maryland and Vir-
ginia Milk Producers Association for alleged violations of Sections
1 and 3 of the Sherman Act. 2 The gravamen of the action was the
combining and conspiring of the two cooperatives to fix the price of
milk sold to distributors who, in turn, sold it to the Government at
Fort Meade, Maryland. It was the premise of the Antitrust Division
that notwithstanding the fact that only cooperatives were involved,
this combination between them violated the "other persons" rule
set forth in Borden.
6 3
Judge Holtzoff rose to the challenge and held that inter-cooper-
ative action was not in violation of the principles set forth in
Borden, and that the immunity provided by the Clayton Act was
sufficiently broad to include such inter-cooperative actions.4
The National Cranberry Association was also involved in 1958
with the issue of immunity in an action brought under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act.65 Two of the Association's members and a num-
ber of its officers were joined as defendants. The opinion provides
mand exclusively from their production. The plaintiff claimed that the Association con-
spired with a bank to force him out of business. The bank made loans to the plaintiff
and mortgages were given on all of the plaintiffs corporate property as security. The
mortgages were foreclosed when the plaintiff could not obtain sufficient working capital
to repay the loans. The foreclosures were allegedly due to the devious manipulations of
the conspirators. Id. at 912-915.
61. The contracts envisaged by Judge Wyzanski as authorized by the Capper-Volstead
Act are those in which the cooperative would fix the price of its products and sell those
products at the same price to everyone. Id, at 907. The cooperative would still be subject
to the provisions of section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act, however, in that the Secretary
of Agriculture could intervene if the price of the commodity were unduly enhanced.
62. 145 F.Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1956).
63. It appeared that the prices charged the Government were still lower than those
charged the general public. Judge Holtzoff remarked: "It may be said perhaps, in a sense,
that the defendants are accused of conspiring to u1ndercharge the Government." Id. at 152.
The Government contended, however, that absent the alleged illegal conspiracy of the co-
operatives, the price would have been lower.
64. "The Government argues that the exemption contained in the Clayton Act does not
apply to a combination of two or more agricultural cooperatives and urges that such a
combination is within the rule of the Borden case . . . this contention cannot be sustained.
The obvious purpose of the Clayton Act was to liberate combinations of farmers and their
cooperative organizations from the prohibitions of the antitrust laws as long as they do
not combine with others who are outside of this category . . . . The exemption should be
construed as applicable to a group of farmers irrespective of whether they are joined
into a single cooperative or into several cooperative associations acting Jointly. Any other
construction would result in partially defeating the intent of the Congress and frustrating
the meaning of the Act." Id. at 153, 154.
65. April v. National Cranberry Ass'n., 168 F.Supp. 919 (D. Mass. 1958). Section
4 of the Clayton Act allows private individuals to sue for damages arising out of viola-
tions of the antitrust laws. If successful, the plaintiff's damage award is trebled as a form
of punitive damages. 38 Stat. 731 (1914). 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
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little information as to the factual nature of the complaint except
that some type of predatory practice was engaged in by the defend-
ants in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The de-
fendants made a motion for summary judgment on the ground
that they were ". .. wholly immune from suit where there is no
allegation of conspiracy with outsiders.
' 6 6
The court denied the motion, at least as to Section 2, by holding
that the Capper-Volstead Act allowed farmers to organize and law-
fully carry out their legitimate objects but did not authorize such
organizations to indulge in purely predatory practices.
67
It was not long before the Justice Department again attempted
to attack the legality of the Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers
Association's conduct. In 1958, a complaint was filed based on three
causes of action: (1) violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act by at-
tempting to monopolize the fluid milk market in Washington D. C.,
Maryland, and Virginia; (2) violations of Sections 1 and 3 of the
Sherman Act in combining and conspiring with others to foreclose
and eliminate competition by acquiring the assets of the chief com-
petitor of the Association, Embassy Dairy; and (3) that such acquis-
tion was also in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.6
The Association raised the affirmative defense of immunity un-
der the Clayton and Capper-Volstead Acts and the court directed a
separate trial of the defense under the provisions of Rule 42 (b).69
Judge Holtzoff held that the defense was good as to the first
cause of action since cooperatives were immune from the antitrust
laws in the absence of any combination or conspiracy with other
persons.
70
As to the second and third causes of action, however, Holtzoff
ruled that the defense was not good since the immunity granted
to cooperatives did not extend to contracts made with other
organizations not entitled to exemption. Moreover, the court ruled
66. Id. at 920. The defendants, of course, were relying on Borden.
67. Id. at 923.
68. United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n., 167 F.Supp. 45
(D.D.C. 1958). Section 7 of the Clayton Act generally provides that corporations shall
not acquire the stock or assets of other corporations where the effect may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monpoly. The section does not apply to
transactions duly consumated pursuant to authority given to the Secretary of Agriculture
under the statutory provision vesting such power in the Secretary. 38 Stat. 731 (1914),
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
69. FsD. R. Crv. P., 28 U.S.C. (1964). The Rule provides that any issue, claim, or
counterclaim may be tried separately when it is more convenient or to avoid prejudice.
70. United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n., supra note 68,
at 52. Judge Holtzoff concluded that the cooperative could engage In unreasonable
restraints of trade with impunity, as long as it did not combine with non-cooperative
entities. He realized that this position might be harmful to the public but he was
definitely of the opinion that the decision in Borden went no further than to subject
Cooperatives to the anti-trust laws only when they combined with others not entitled to the
immunity provided by the Clayton and Capper-Volstead Acts. He determined that if the
aforesaid acts were inadequate to protect the public, it was the function of Congress to
amend them, not that of the court
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that the Capper-Volstead Act did not exempt agricultural coopera-
tives from the terms of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
7 '
When the third cause of action was tried, 72 the court held that
the acquisition of Embassy Dairy was in violation of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act. As a result of the acquisition, the Association now
controlled 91.7 per cent of the government sales market whereas it
controlled only 45 per cent before the acquisition. Further, the most
significant competitor of the association had been eliminated and
non-member producers who had previously sold their milk to Em-
bassy were now forced to join the Association or find a market else-
where. There could be no doubt that the transaction had the effect
of lessening competition in the milkshed area. The Association was
ordered to divest itself of the Embassy Dairy assets within a reason-
able time. 7' The second cause of action was tried two months
later and Judge Holtzoff held that the acquisition of Embassy Dairy
was a per se violation of Section 3 of the Sherman Act as well as a
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
74
The decisions were appealed to the Supreme Court 75 and the
district court's holding at 167 F. Supp. 45 that the Association
acting by itself could not be held in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act was reversed. 76 The Court said:
We are satisfied that the allegations of the complaint and
the statement of particulars . . . charge anticompetitive ac-
tivities which are so far outside the "legitimate objects" of a
cooperative that, if proved, they would constitute clear viola-
tions of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. .... 77
71. As Judge Holtzoff viewed the matter, section 7 of the Clayton Act constituted a
limitation on the cooperative's power to make contracts pursuant to section 1 of the Cap-
per-Volstead Act. Id. at 58.
72. 167 F.Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958). After a short recess following the decision in 167
F.Supp. 45, supra note 68, regarding the defense of immunity, the trial on the merits of the
second and third causes of action ensued. The third cause of action was tried first.
73. The cooperative had contended that the purchase had been approved by the Secre-
tary of Agriculture and therefore the transaction would be exempted from § 7 of the
Clayton Act. Although there was some evidence that the Marketing Division of the
Farmer Cooperative Service of the Department of Agriculture had approved the acquisition
of Embassy Dairy, Judge Holtzoff ruled that there was no statutory provision as required
by § 7 authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to approve such a transaction. Id. at 808.
74. 168 F.Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1959). Judge Holtzoff rejected the contention of the co-
operative that transactions between cooperatives and organizations not clothed with the
Immunity of the Clayton and Capper-Volstead Acts should not be subject to the scrutiny
of the antitrust laws unless the transaction resulted in a benefit to the organization not
enjoying cooperative status.
75. 360 U.S. 927 (1959).
76. 362 U.S. 458 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Maryland and Virginia]. The Gov-
ernment had appealed on the basis of Judge Holtzoff's ruling in 167 F.Supp. 45 that the
cooperative acting alone, could not be held under section 2 of the Sherman Act; and the
cooperative appealed the rulings holding it liable for violations of section 3 of the Sher-
man Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act.
77. Id. at 468. Indeed, it would appear that the Association was engaging in some
rather predatory practices. Besides the purchase of Embassy Dairy, there were a number
of instances where the Association attempted to interfere with truck shipments of non-
members' milk, and an attempt during 1939-1942 to induce a Washington dairy to exclude
its non-Association producers from the market Moreover, a boycott of a dairy owner in
order to coerce him to buy Association milk was also charged.
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As to the exemption granted by Section 6 of the Clayton Act,
the Court said:
Thus, the full effect of Section 6 is that a group of farmers
acting together as a single entity in an association cannot
be restrained from "lawfully carrying out the legitimate ob-
jects thereof," but the section cannot support the contention
that it gives an entity full freedom to engage in predatory
trade practices at will.7
8
The Court recognized that the Capper-Volstead Act was intended
to allow individual farmers acting through cooperatives the same
competitive advantages as other forms of corporations, but also
emphasized that cooperatives must be subject to the same responsi-
bilities, such as compliance with the provisions of the antitrust laws.
The Court summarized its position on the Capper-Volstead Act:
S. . [t]he Act did not leave cooperatives free to engage
in practices against other persons in order to monopolize
trade, or restrain and suppress competition with the coopera-
tive.7
9
Reaffirming its position in the Borden case, the Court held that
the Secretary of Agriculture does not have exclusive jurisdiction in
prosecuting cooperative monopolizations; nor does the Secretary
have the authority under Section 7 of the Clayton Act to approve an
agreement between a cooperative and others which would result
in creating an unlawful monopoly position.
The court concluded by discussing the issue as to whether the
acquisition of Embassy Dairy was a valid transaction under the
Capper-Volstead Act which authorizes cooperatives to make the
necessary contracts and agreements for the purpose of processing,
preparing, handling and marketing its members' products.
Under ordinary circumstances, the Court felt that the acquisition
might very well be valid as an exercise of the cooperative's con-
tractural authority. But when considered in view of the pattern of
events, the transaction was tainted with the illegality of the Associa-
tion's prior conduct 0
78. Id. at 465, 466.
79. Id. at 467.
80. "The Embassy assets [that] the Association acquired are useful in processing and
marketing milk, and we may assume, as it is contended, that their purchase simply for bus-
iness use, without more, often would be permitted and would be lawful under the Capper-
Volstead Act. But even lawful contracts and business activities may help to make up
a pattern of conduct unlawful under the Sherman Act . . . We hold that the privilege the
Capper-Volstead Act grants producers to conduct their affairs collectively does not in-
clude a privilege to combine with competitors so as to use a monoply position as a lever
further to suppress competition by and among independent producers and processors."
Supra note 76, at 471, 472.
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The judgment of the district court was upheld as to violations
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 3 of the Sherman Act.
For the Justice Department, a victory had been won. No longer
could it be said that a cooperative, acting alone, could not be held
accountable under the Sherman and Clayton Acts whenever such
actions went beyond the legitimate objects of the organization.
Sunkist Growers, Inc. is one of the largest agricultural coopera-
tives in existence. It consists of some 12,000 growers who are or-
ganized into local associations, which associations are further
organized into district exchanges, and representatives from the
district exchanges form the governing body of Sunkist. Exchange
Lemon Products is a processing cooperative formed in 1915 by a
group of associations within the Sunkist family engaged in proces-
sing and developing lemon by-products. Exchange Orange Products
serves the same function as Exchange Lemon, but its facilities are
available to all of the growers since Sunkist acquired all of its assets
in 1931. All products of Exchange Lemon and Exchange Orange
are marketed through the central Sunkist products department
which is managed by directors from both processing cooperatives.
Sunkist's operations are conducted in the California-Arizona area.
Within that area there were four competing independent processors
who largely relied on Sunkist for their supply of by-product oranges
which were mainly processed into orange juice.
Silzle and TreeSweet, two of the independent processors, held
process-purchase contracts8' with Exchange Orange in 1951, with
a net cost per ton of oranges to the processors of $17.66 and $25.10,
respectively. Winckler & Smith, another of the independent pro-
cessors, allegedly was refused a similar contract and could not buy
oranges from Sunkist except at the list price which averaged
from $40.00 to $44.00 per ton. As a result, Winckler & Smith claimed
that it could not compete in the single strength juice market.
Winckler & Smith brought suit against Sunkist, Exchange
Orange, Exchange Lemon, Silzle, and TreeSweet for alleged vio-
lations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 2 The complaint
alleged, in substance, that a conspiracy existed between the defend-
ants to restrain and monopolize interstate trade and commerce in
citrus fruits and its products. The trial court awarded judgment
to Winckler & Smith. A portion of the jury instructions inferred
that the jury could find that Sunkist, Exchange Orange, and Ex-
change Lemon could be guilty of unlawfully conspiring under the
81. Generally, such contracts provided that the independent processors would process
a quantity of fruit for Exchange Orange at cost and then the processor would purchase
the resultant juices at Sunkist's list price less discounts and allowances. Sunkist Growers,
Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prod. Co., 284 F.2d 1, 13 (9th Cir. 1960).
82. The action in the district court is unreported. Any references to that action must
be taken from the appeal as reported supra note 81.
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Sherman Act without any additional finding that they had conspired
with the other defendants, Silzle and TreeSweet.13 Sunkist appealed,
claiming, inter alia, that the instruction was erroneous since the
verdict very probably was based on the premise that Sunkist had
conspired with itself.
The decision on appeal was delayed until the Supreme Court
had given its opinion in the Maryland and Virginia case. Armed
with the decision in that case, the court of appeals affirmed the
liability of Sunkist but reversed on the determination of damages,
holding that they were too speculative. Judge Barnes 84 used the
language in Maryland and Virginia with great effect. He con-
cluded that the cooperatives had no blanket exemption and could
be held responsible under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for unlawful
monopolization or attempts to monopolize and under Section 1 for
unlawful acts constituting restraints and suppression of compe-
tition. 5 As to Sunkist's contention that the jury instructions were
improper, Barnes said:
We do not now understand (since the Milk Producers deci-
sion) that different agricultural cooperatives, combining to-
gether, are entitled to claim a total immunity for acts which
they may lawfully do unilaterally, any more than individuals
may claim for certain of their joint actions the same im-
munity under antitrust laws which would exist as to their
several independent acts.""
The court further refused to disturb the jury's finding that the
alleged refusal to sell to Winckler & Smith was unlawful, holding
that the verdict could have been based on either (1) the alleged
83. A portion of the Jury instructions read: "Unless you find, therefore, from the pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that Sunkist or Exchange Orange or either of them, combined
or conspired with either TreeSweet, or SlIzle, or ELP (Exchange Lemon Products), and
in 1951 did one or more of the specific acts charged . . . . Unless you find from the
preponderance of the evidence that defendants Sunkist and Exchange Orange, or either
of them, and one or more of the alleged conspirators [one of which was Exchange Lemon]
combined and conspired, and pursuant to such combination or conspiracy .... "
The trial Judge huddled with the attorneys and then issued what he believed to be
a clarification of the instructions: "I am told that I spoke about how the defendants had
conspired on one occasion. The charge is not that the defendants conspired. The charge
is that the defendants and co-conspirators conspired.
"However, as a matter of fact you may find that nobody conspired, or you may
pick out and decide that some number less than the total conspired." 284 F.2d at 21, 22.
It is questionable whether the jurors could comprehend the long and detailed in-
structions. The judge was giving the instructions thusly: "Now, so that you will not be
confused, let's back up. Here are cooperatives which are permitted to combine together to
produce and market their fruit. The antitrust laws say that they may lawfully do that,
and the antitrust laws say that they shall not be in violation of any--are you sleepy
down there?' Juror Daiker: "No." The Court: " . . . shall not be In violation of the anti-
trust law ... I" Id. at 19, 20.
84. Judge Barnes is the same individual who spoke at the American Institute of Co-
operation in 1953 when he was then heading the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment, &upra note 32.
85. Supra note 83, at 9.
86. Id. at 22.
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illegal conspiracy and agreement to make contracts constituting a
restraint of trade or (2) the alleged illegal sole trader decision
not to sell, made with an intent to illegally restrain trade or com-
merce, or (3) a similar unilateral decision not to sell, except at a
fixed price, made from a monopoly position, with an intent or
purpose to eliminate a competitor.
8 7
The conclusion drawn from the case is one that must have
stunned the cooperatives. It appeared that the results in Maryland
and Virginia and the instant decision stripped the cooperatives of
all immunity under the Sherman Act except that regarding the
basic right to organize guaranteed by the Clayton and Capper-
Volstead Acts.
Certiorari was granted to Sunkist and limited to the issue of
the immunity of interorganizational dealings between the coopera-
tives from the conspiracy provisions of the antitrust laws. 88
Justice Clark delivered the decision.8 9 He noted that the jury
instructions clearly would allow a finding of liability on a deter-
mination that an unlawful conspiracy existed between Sunkist, Ex-
change Orange, and the allegedly distinct and separate entity of
Exchange Lemon. The lower courts had concluded that Sunkist
and Exchange Orange were, in fact, one cooperative and Exchange
Lemon was another cooperative entity.
In a summary manner, Clark concluded that the three coopera-
tives were all part of one organization, and therefore no conspiracy
could exist.90 Since one theory of liability was in error, the Court
87. The court determined the applicable product as single strength Valencia orange
juice and the appropriate market area as confined to California and Arizona. The court
stated that Sunkist controlled about 70% of the product oranges in 1951. The other 30%
was grown by smaller associations. When Winckler & Smith was organized in 1946 It
bought a considerable amount of oranges from Sunkist but its purchases tapered off until.
In 1950, they were very insignificant customers of Sunkist. In 1951, Sunkist started a
policy, whereby it would dispose of all of its product oranges through Exchange Orange
Products. Sunkist did sell some 46,000 tons to independent processors in 1951, and EOP
was left with an additional 122,800 tons on hand. Silzle and TreeSweet processed a sig-
nificant share of that amount.
In 1950, EOP processed 11% of the single strength orange juice in the relevant
market area, and 58% in 1951, after its decision to integrate. As to Sunkist's alleged re-
fusal to give Winckler & Smith a contract similar to the process-purchase contracts held
by Silzle and TreeSweet, the court said: "An individual refusal to deal is preserved
wherever it is reasonably ancillary to the effectuation of lawful marketing objectives ...
Thus, in this case we conclude the question as to whether there had been a concerted
refusal to sell, were questions of fact for the jury's determination." Id. at 17.
In any event, Judge Barnes determined that the alleged refusal to sell could be il-
legal under the antitrust laws whether such action was taken unilaterally, or in combina-
tion with others and that there was sufficient evidence to justify the jury's consideration
of all three theories of liability.
88. 368 U.S. 813 (1961).
89. 370 U.S. 19 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Sunkist].
90. "There can be no doubt that under these statutes (Clayton and Capper-Volstead)
the 12,000 California-Arizona citrus growers ultimately involved could join together into
one organization for the collective processing and marketing of their fruit and fruit
products without the business decisions of their officers being held combinations or con-
spiracies." Id. at 28. Moreover, the Court said: "With due respect to the contrary opinions
of the Court of Appeals and the District Court, we feel that the 12,000 growers here in-
volved are in practical effect and in the contemplation of the statutes one 'organization'
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went no further in its examination of the others. Certiorari was
granted to determine immunity from conspiracy charges in inter-
organizational dealings, but the decision only settled Sunkist's con-
spiracy immunity in intraorganizational matters. 91 The decision
did not alter the previous holdings in Borden and Maryland and
Virginia in any respect. Certainly it would be erroneous to state
that Sunkist stands for the proposition that conspiracies between
separate cooperatives are immune from conspiracy charges brought
under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
92
The Sunkist saga was far from finished. Case-Swayne Co., the
other independent processor allegedly the victim of Sunkist's manipu-
lations, also brought an action charging unlawful monopoly prac-
tices. The case was brought before the district court after the
decision of the Supreme Court in Sunkist had been rendered, and
presumably, a motion for a directed verdict was granted Sunkist
partially on the basis of that decision.
93
The court of appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to
present a jury question. Viewing the evidence in its most favorable
light to the plaintiff, the court held that if the jury found that the
relevant product market was Southern California and Arizona, they
could find that Sunkist was guilty of unlawful monopoly practices or
an attempt thereof.
9 4
or 'association' even though they have formally organized themselves into three separate
legal entities. To hold otherwise would be to impose grave legal consequences upon or-
ganizational distinctions that are of de minit meaning and effect . . . . There is no
indication that the use of separate corporations had economic significance in itself or that
outsiders considered and dealt with the three entities as Independent organizations." Id.
at 29.
91. The Court rested its decision only on the ground that Sunkist, Exchange Orange
and Exchange Lemon were not separate entities insofar as the conspiracy provisions of
section 2 of the Sherman Act Is concerned.
92. The Court qualified its approval of Intercooperative dealings by stating that in
this case, it did not appear that the " . . . use of separate corporations had economic sig-
nificance in itself or that outsiders considered and dealt with the three entities as inde-
pendent organizations." Supra note 90. It is doubtful whether different cooperatives, combin-
ing together into one organization, could claim the benefit of the Sunkist decision if they
did not meet the qualifications named above. Furthermore, any acquisition of the assets
or stock of other corporate associations would doubtless receive the scrutiny of the courts
under section 7 of the Clayton Act as applied in Maryland and Virginia.
93. Again, the district court decision is not reported. The complaint charged violations
of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369
F.2d 449, 451 (9th Cir. 1966). The district court also had held that Sunkist and its af-
filiates were engaged in an integration program whereby Exchange Orange was processing
nearly all of the organization's by-product oranges used In making single strength orange
juice; that the relevant market area was not limited to the California-Arizona sphere but
had to be considered as nationwide in view of the competition from the orange juice in-
dustry in Florida; that because of the low prices for oranges in Florida, processors there
could sell their juice in the California market at a lesser price than juice produced lo-
cally; that as a result of competition from Florida, the price to the consumer throughout
the states of single strength orange juice depended a great deal on the price of oranges to
the Florida processors; and that the relevant product market was not limited to single
strength orange juice but must include orange juice concentrates (which neither party to
the instant action produced). As the district court found that the relevant market area
was nationwide in scope, Sunkist was held as not constituting a monopoly. On the na-
tional scene, Sunkist controlled only 6 to 7% of the orange production, as compared to
70% In the California-Arizona area. Id. at 452, 453.
94. The court merely concluded that there was evidence that the relevant geographic
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Sunkist contended that size alone nor the mere possession of
monopoly power violated the Sherman Act but rather the wrongful
use of such power. The court agreed but held that the ultimate
issue in determining liability under Section 2 was ". . . whether the
defendants control the price and competition in the market for
such part of trade or commerce as they are charged with monopo--
lizing. ' 95
At the time this action was prosecuted, Exchange Lemon had
been completely absorbed by Sunkist which was not the case when
Winckler & Smith litigation was current. Sunkist's membership now
consisted of 80.12 per cent fruit growers, 4.97 per cent were corporate
growers, and 14.91 per cent were private corporations, partnerships
and individuals. The latter group, called agency associations, were
not growers but merely handled fruit for growers and marketed
it through the Sunkist organization.96
The court held that the organizational structure of Sunkist was
in compliance with Section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act. Moreover,
the contracts with the agency associations were valid since they
were of a nature that were contemplated under Capper-Volstead. 97
Judge Ely dissented.98
Notwithstanding the validity of the organizational structure under
Capper-Volstead, the court remained firm in its position that the
question of liability under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act was
a question for the jury and the directed verdict could not stand.
Case-Swayne appealed the court of appeals ruling that Sunkist
was a bona fide Capper-Volstead cooperative and certiorari was
granted by the Supreme Court on the question as to whether Sunkist
forfeited its antitrust immunity by including non-growers (the agency
associations) in its membership. The Court, per Justice Marshall,
answered in the affirmative.9 9
Justices White and Stewart concurred in the result but felt
that the Court went too far in holding that Sunkist forfeited its anti-
market could be limited to California and Arizona and therefore a directed verdict was
not proper. Id. at 458.
95. 1d
96. The agency associations were independent contractors furnishing packing facilities
to the Sunkist organization. The parties stipulated that such agency associations were
not Capper-Volstead cooperatives. 369 F.2d at 460, n. 18.
97. The majority felt that such packing contracts with the agency associations were
certainly within Sunkist's "legitimate objects," and since such contracts could have been
legally made with separate organizations, the fact that such associations constituted a
class of membership did not affect the exempt status of the entire organization. Id. at 462.
98. Judge Ely felt that the Supreme Court decision in Sunkist was limited to coopera-
tives whose members were bona fide growers or producers. Ely noted that the parties
agreed that the agency associations were not entitled to the Capper-Volstead exemption
and concluded that since Sunkist had combined with non-cooperative entities in the form
of agency associations, the protection offered it by the Capper-Volstead Act was de-
stroyed. Judge Ely certainly had authority for his position in Borden and Maryland and
Virginia. Id. at 464.
99. Case-Swayne Company v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 88 S.Ct. 528 (1967).
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trust immunity completely. The concurring opinion would have
limited Case-Swayne's recovery to only those damages which arose
from the restraint of trade resulting from agreements between the
Sunkist organization and the non-grower agency associations. No
recovery would thus be allowed from injuries caused by transactions
between Sunkist and its member grower cooperatives.
Justice Harlan also concurred in the Court's finding that Con-
gress did not intend that cooperatives with non-grower members
should enjoy the antitrust immunity provided by Section 1 of the
Capper-Volstead Act, but dissented from the Court's apparent holding
that Sunkist's immunity should be removed from those transactions
which the agency associations entered into for their own benefit
rather than the benefit of the grower members.
Justice Douglas filed a dubitante opinion, stating that the
question of the extent of the cooperative's loss of immunity when
non-growers are included in its membership was not argued and
should be reserved.
The Denver Milk Producers"° case, decided in 1964, reflects
the Supreme Court ruling in Sunkist. The complaint was dismissed
on the ground that it alleged only an intracooperative conspiracy.
The court held that Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibited con-
spiracies in restraint of trade between separate business entities
and that the plaintiff's failure to allege such a conspiracy was
fatal to the action. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that
the cooperatives's officers, directors, and employees could unlaw-
fully conspire with each other and the cooperative.
[n] othing . . . suggests that a corporate officer can
be regarded as a conspirator with his fellow officers and his
own corporation in violation of the conspiracy provisions of
Section 2 when he merely acts as an officer to establish the
policy and advance the interests of the corporation-and this
is so even when the policy of the corporation is to monopo-
lize.101
The factual situation in Bergjams Dairy Company v. Sanitary
Milk Producers'0 2 is reminiscent of Maryland and Virginia. The
complaint alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
and Section 2 of the Clayton Act. The cooperative acquired the
assets of its chief competitor and granted rebates to retailers in an
effort to gain a monopoly position. The court stated that Sanitary
100. Schoenberg Farms, Inc. v. Denver Milk Producers, Inc., 231 F.Supp. 266 (D. Colo.
1964).
101. Id. at 270. See Tillamook Cheese & Dairy Ass'n. v. Tillamook County Creamery
Ass'n., 358 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1966).
102. 241 F.Supp. 476 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
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had entered the milk processing field in bad faith and the Capper-
Volstead Act would not immunize the cooperative from liability for
its trade practices where such practices were executed by illegal
means. 10 8 On appeal, the judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.
104
The Texas range wars probably provided less excitement than
North Texas Producer's Ass'n. v. Metzger Dairies, Inc. 0 5 The de-
fendant-appellee, a large processor, filed suit against the cooperative
alleging seven counts in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
including a boycott and coercion. The evidence appeared to vindicate
Metzger's complaint.1 06 The principles set forth in Maryland and
Virginia were applied and the cooperative was found to be far from
pursuing any legitimate objects that it might have.
On October 4, 1966 the "embattled farmers" of Pennsylvania
filed suit against a group of milk processors. On October 25, 1966
the processors filed suit against the "embattled farmers." Both
suits charged violations of the Sherman Act.10 The United Dairy
Farmers charged that the processors were using a front organiza-
tion, Dairyman's Cooperative Sales Association, Inc., to serve its own
interests rather than the farmers comprising the association. The
processors countered with the charge that the UDF was conspiring
to monopolize the Pittsburgh milk market.
0 8
The court quickly recognized that the two complaints were an
effort to conduct collective bargaining of milk prices in the guise
103. The court refused to hold that a conspiracy existed between the retail dealers and
the cooperative. Id. at 486.
104. 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
105. 348 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 977 (1966).
106. The Association was comprised of about 2500 dairymen who supplied about 85 to
90% of the raw milk marketed in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. Metzger was a large
processor in Dallas and purchased 75% of his requirements from the Association. The
Association raised the price of its milk and Metzger reluctantly acceeded to the demand.
The Association further demanded that Metzger stop buying milk from producers other
than the Association but Metzger refused and started purchasing his milk elsewehre at
considerably higher prices.
The Association attempted to stop Metzger's alternative supply of milk and made
several efforts to purchase the assets of Metzger. The broker who was to negotiate the
sale testified that he had heard Association officers speak; of their desire to - . . . get
Jake Metzger out of the dairy business .... " so that the Association could control the
price of milk in the area.
Metzger suffered boycotts of grocers handling his milk; the evidence tended to sup-
port that such boycotts were instigated by the Association. A letter was also circulated
by the Association which stated: "Metzger is still shipping in milk from the north and
paying up to 75c per hundred more for some of it than is being paid for local milk ....
We would like to urge all members to talk with their friends, neighbors, grocers and bus-
iness associates and suggest to them that they should buy milk from a plant that dis-
tributes local milk-not northern milk." Id. at 194, 196.
107. Isaly Dairy Co. of Pittsburgh v. United Dairy Farmers, 250 F.Supp. 99 (W.D.
Penn. 1966).
108. The United Dairy Farmers (hereinafter referred to as the UDF) charged that the
Dairyman's Cooperative Sales Association (hereinafter referred to as DCSA) was being
used and controlled by the processors as a means of forcing the members of the DCSA
to accept low prices for milk and that the Association was not truly representing the
farmer members. The UDF was formed apparently to give the dairymen a more efficient
voice in collective bargaining.
The processors charged the UDF with violations of the antitrust laws In the form
of picketing the processors' plants. Id. at 100.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
of antitrust actions. The processors real complaint was that the
UDF was attempting to persuade members of the DCSA to join
the UDF, and the gist of UDF's action was dissatisfaction with the
efforts of DCSA as a bargaining agent for the area dairy farmers.
The court conceded that the regulation of milk prices was a problem
of no little significance, but referred the parties to the legislature
for a solution to their problem. 10 9 The processor's application for
a preliminary injunction was refused.
The processors complained of demonstrations and picketing
organized by the UDF but which had been judicially supervised. The
court summarily rejected the allegation that such demonstrations,
peaceful in nature, were unlawful by stating:
The "embattled farmers" . . . are therefore simply making
a successful "adjustment" to the surroundings of their mod-
ern cultural milieu when they dramatize their claims by
demonstrations. Their standing is not inferior to that of oth-
er protesting groups merely because they did not hire Mike
Quill or Martin Luther King to serve as impressario of
their show.110
In Otto Milk Company v. United Dairy Farmers' Cooperative
Ass'n., 1' the defendant cooperative combined with the UDF and
engaged in a boycott and picketing of plaintiff's retail outlets in
an effort to persuade the retail stores to buy defendants' milk. The
court held such activities in violation of the Sherman Act as exceed-
ing the boundaries of the cooperatives' legitimate objects. Indeed,
such group boycotts are per se violations of Section 2.112
Notwithstanding the absence of actual monopolization, the court
said that it was sufficient if a tendency toward monopolization or a
reasonable likelihood of a substantial lessening of competition existed
to justify injunctive relief.""
The defendants' contention that the picketing was an exercise
of their constitutional right of free speech was rejected. The court
held that the objective of the picketing was to accomplish a result
which violated the Sherman Act. As such, the picketing went further
109. "Pennsylvania has also established milk price legislation . . . The fact that the
Milk Control Board has recently been in bad odor, and may be considered as an illustra-
tion of the rule that the passage of time often dims the crusading zeal of regulatory bodies
and makes them attentive rather to the interests regulated than to the interests of the
public, does not detract from the truth of the proposition that the milk problem is one
for solution by legislative and administrative action . . . rather than by litigation in the
courts." Id. at 101.
110. Id. at 102.
111. 261 F.Supp. 381 (W.D. Penn. 1966). The UDF was a co-defendant and Is an en-
tirely separate organization.
112. The boycott was carried out in 5 counties. Many retail dealers who were picketed
acquiesced and refranled from purchasing the plaintiff's milk. Id. at 383, 885.
113. The court relied on United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 878 U.S. 158 (1964).
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than merely "telling their story," and could not be afforded the
immunity given to other modes of expression.
114
PART C-EPILOGUE
. . . agricultural cooperatives can no longer be thought of
in terms of infinitesimal economic units revolving about
the orbit of the nation's economy. As the balance of power
between agricultural cooperatives and other units of the na-
tion's economy approaches equality, these associations will
find themselves more and more amenable to the economic
premise which governs the rest of business. 1 5
Although this statement by Judge Barnes was uttered almost
15 years ago, it is as pertinent now as it was then. The accuracy
of the prophecy is particularly strengthened by the decision in
Maryland and Virginia and subsequent decisions relying on that
case for authority. It can be stated with reasonable certainty that a
cooperative will be held responsible under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act for monopolization whenever it engages in unilateral monopoly
practices which do not meet the "legitimate objects" test and
may be held liable for joint trade practices with "other persons"
notwithstanding that such practices would not be unlawful if executed
solely by the cooperative. Further, the contracts which a cooperative
may enter into pursuant to Section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act
cannot operate to suppress competition and restrain trade in vio-
lation of the antitrust laws. In short, it would appear that any
immunity beyond the fundamental premise that cooperatives, as a
form of business combination, are not to be held in violation of
the antitrust laws, is illusory.
The legislative intent, and even the plain language of the Capper-
Volstead Act has been violated insofar as the role of the Secretary
of Agriculture is concerned. 11e The Department of Justice has as-
sumed almost complete jurisdiction in the policing of the coopera-
114. The picketing consisted of a great deal more than a mere peaceful demonstration
as was the case in Isaly Dairy Co. of Pittsburgh v. United Dairy Farmers, supra note 107.
115. Barnes, supra note 32 at 33.
116. Section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act appears quite clear on the point of Jurisdic-
tion. The Congress, In its debates on the Act, stated: "The first question which has arisen
is why the Secretary of Agriculture should be named as the officer to find whether the
associtaion has unduly enhanced prices. I know of no officer more competent to deal with
that question than the Secretary of Agriculture. He has in his department a Bureau of
Markets. He keeps track of the cost of production, the cost of selling, and what the pub-
lic is paying. He has the statistics and he, through his Bureau of Markets, can determine
better than any other agency of the Government whether such a cooperative marketing
association is really being operated in restraint of trade as a monopoly and is unduly
enhancing prices.
"The Attorney General has the duty placed upon him to take charge of the suit in
the court and to prosecute it, but the Attorney General has not the machinery to study
these cooperative associations, to find out the cost of production, the cost of selling, the
reasonable prices to the consumers, and various other elements which it is easy for the
Secretary of Agriculture to find out." 62 CoNa. REc. 2049 (remarks of Sen. Kellogg).
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tives, which does not seem wise in terms of which agency is best
equipped to make an intelligent evaluation of the economic realities
of agricultural monopolizations. It would appear that the Secretary
of Agriculture and his staff are far more able to determine when
the activities of cooperatives restrain trade and unduly enhance the
price of agricultural products. It must be recognized that the sole
object of an agricultural cooperative is to enhance the price of
products handled for its members-this is the "legitimate object."
If the courts shackle the cooperatives with all of the burdens created
by the antitrust laws, one of the most effective private means for
agricultural collective bargaining power will be destroyed.
The search for parity goes on. Whether the "embattled farmers"
succeed in their search by means of cooperative action largely
depends on the attitude of the courts toward the ultimate status of
the cooperatives under the antitrust laws.
III. NORTH DAKOTA COOPERATIVES-CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON
In 1966, North Dakota cooperatives listed 242,319 stockholders,
transacted $323,494,915.71 in business, and had net earnings of
$13,080,648.72.1' The figures amply support the statement that co-
operatives are big business in the State. The totals, however, include
non-agricultural cooperatives as the North Dakota Department of
Agriculture and Labor, through its Cooperative Division, is charged
with encouraging the formation of cooperatives of all kinds. 118
Statutory authority exists for the following kinds of cooperative enter-
prises: Cooperative Marketing Associations,"19 Mutual Aid non-profit
Cooperatives,'120 Electric Cooperative Corporations, 121 Grazing Associ-
ations,1 22 Credit Unions,' 23 and for any other lawful business except
banking, insurance, and building or operating public railroads. 124
In North Dakota, authorization for the cooperative form of business
organization nearly blankets the economy.
12 5
117. 1965 STAT. REP. Div. OF COoPERATrvEs 109, NORTH DAKOTA PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.
118. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 4-06-09 and 4-06-11 (Supp. 1967). The agricultural coopera-
tives (elevators and creameries) listed 92,288 stockholders, transacted $182,585,287.32 in
business, and had net earnings of $5,996,845.32. NORTH DAKOTA PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, supra
note 117, Tables 2 and 4.
119. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 10-15 (Supp. 1967).
120. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 10-12 (1960).
121. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 10-18 (Supp. 1967).
122. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 36-08 (Supp. 1967).
123. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 6-06 (Supp. 1967).
124. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-15-02 (1960).
125. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 4-06 (Supp. 1967) provides for a "Federated Co-operative Ag-
ricultural Association" which would be organized in conjunction with similar Associa-
tions in other agricultural states having a community of interest in agricultural problems.
The Associations thus organized would be sponsored under the auspices of the particular
state involved and would then merge to form one Association which would maintain lob-
bies In the state legislatures and Congress to present data on agricultural subjects to the
end that wise legislation may be enacted in the interests of agriculture.
The provisions of Chapter 4-06 provide an excellent means of organization pursuant
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There are extensive provisions in the North Dakota Century
Code specifying the requirements for organization and operation of
the cooperatives.126 One of the most important provisions provides:
No association organized under this chapter (10-15) shall be
deemed to be a combination in restraint of trade or an il-
legal monopoly, or an attempt to lessen competition or fix
prices arbitrarily. The marketing contracts or agreements
between any such association and its members, or any agree-
ments authorized in this chapter, shall not be considered il-
legal nor in restraint of trade.1
27
The above section would appear to be sufficient to allow farmers
the right to organize into cooperatives without being held in vio-
lation of the State antitrust laws.128 To date, however, the agricul-
tural cooperatives have not been forced to litigate their rights and
immunities under the antitrust provisions.
It would be wise for the cooperatives to heed the decisions in
Borden, Maryland and Virginia, and Sunkist as a guide to their
activities. From a reading of the statutes, section 10-15-59 confers
no greater immunity in intrastate commerce from the State anti-
trust laws than the immunity the Capper-Volstead and Clayton Acts
provide from the Sherman Act when interstate commerce is involved.
It should be noted that section 51-08-01 of the North Dakota
Century Code prohibits any individual or association from creating,
entering into, or being a party to any contract or agreement which
fixes the amount of production of any commodity within the State. 1 29
Such unilateral limiting of production in order to raise prices has
a doubtful legality, especially in view of Judge Barnes's statement
that there is a profound difference in limiting agricultural produc-
tion by governmental programs as opposed to private action.5 0 If
any cooperative, or group of cooperatives, attempts such a move,
it is fairly certain that the courts will be called upon to settle the
issue.
North Dakota cooperatives have yet another hurdle and potential
stumbling block. The State Constitution provides:
to the cooperative concept among states, but as yet no implementing action has been
taken. In fact, it is highly doubtful that this concept will ever materialize since the statute
has been In effect since 1935.
126. See N.D. CENT. CODE, supra note 119.
127. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-15-59 (1960).
128. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 51-08 (1960) § 51-08-01 provides: "Any corporation organized
under the laws of this state or doing business in this state, or any partnership, associa-
tion, or Individual, creating, entering into, or becoming a member of or a party to, any
pool, trust, agreement, contract, combination, or confederation, to regulate or fix the
price of any article of merchandise, commodity, or property, or to fix or limit the amount
or quantity of any articles, property, merchandise, or commodity to be manufactured,
mined, produced, exchanged, or sold in this state, Is guilty of a misdemeanor."
129. Id.
130. See the text contained In note 57.
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Any combination between individuals, corporations, associ-
ations, or either having for its object or effect the control-
ling of the price of any product of the soil or any article
of manufacture or commerce, or the cost of exchange or
transportation, is prohibited and hereby declared unlawful
and against public policy .... 181
The sweeping constitutional declaration could provide no small
amount of trouble to the cooperatives. Like the antitrust laws, the
cooperatives have not tested its provisions. Perhaps the best solu-
tion, as stated by another author, is to initiate an amendment to
Section 146 which would reflect ". . new policies and attitudes."' 182
It is also arguable that the section should be completely repealed
as subsequent legislation has more adequately enunciated the State's
position on monopoly and the remedies incident thereto. 183
North Dakota is at peace with the cooperatives today. Tomorrow
may bring the storm.
BRUCE E. BOHLMAN
131. N.D. CONST. art. 7, § 146.
132. Nelson, Co-operatives Can Be In Restraint of Trade, 23 N.D. STATE BAR AsS'N.
BAR Bumps, 87, 42 (1947).
133. The State Constitution was adopted in 1889. Shortly thereafter, in 1890, the legis-
lature enacted chapter 174 of the Session Laws of that year which is now § 61-08-01
of the Code prohibiting pools and trusts. By 1901, all of what is now chapter 51-08 was
enacted. Certainly, § 146 of the Constitution is now unneeded in view of Chapter 51-08
and Chapter 4-14 which prohibits unfair discrimination in the purchase of farm products.
The framers of the State Constitution were mindful of the evils of monopoly when
they drafted § 146 and the susceptibility of the State's agricultural population to the in-
dustrial predators of the day. It would be unfortunate if the same section which was de-
signed to protect the farmer would now be used as a bludgeon to destroy his means of
collective bargaining power. Such a situation could, and should be avoided by repealing
the section. In any event, it is very unlikely that the courts will accord § 146 any great
weight if and when a cooperative is prosecuted under its provisions. Time has mellowed
it and it is most surely clothed by more than 75 years of judicial and legislative decisions
and enactments dealing with the rights and liabilities of the cooperatives under the antitrust
laws.
